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People tend to make spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) when confronted with
the behavior of others. Recent research has demonstrated that these STIs may be
moderated by contextual cues such as stereotypic category labels. The central
aim of the current research was to investigate the role of cognitive resources in
this process. Two experiments were performed in which STIs were measured us-
ing a probe recognition paradigm under low or high cognitive load. Under high
cognitive load, STIs were less likely for stereotype–inconsistent than stereo-
type–consistent behaviors. Compared to baseline, STIs for inconsistent behav-
iors were less strong under high cognitive load. Under low-load, no differences
in STIs as a function of stereotypes were found. These findings support the idea
that stereotypes are especially likely to affect STIs when resources are low.
Spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) are said to occur “when attending to
another person’s behavior produces a trait inference in the absence of
our explicit intention to infer traits or form an impression of that person”
(Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996, p. 211). For instance, when you
observe someone carrying an elderly woman’s groceries across the
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street, the trait “helpful” may be spontaneously activated (Winter,
Uleman, & Cunniff, 1985). Convincing evidence for the occurrence of
STIs has been obtained using several research paradigms (e.g., Carlston
& Skowronski, 1994; Carlston, Skowronski, & Sparks, 1995; Newman,
1991, 1993; Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moskowitz, 1996; Winter &
Uleman, 1984; Winter et al., 1985).
As yet, most research into STIs has focused solely on behaviors,
whereas the features of the actors have remained nondescript (e.g., John,
Mary) or have been described by an irrelevant category label (for an ex-
ception, see Mae, Carlston, & Skowronski, 1999). In real life, however,
we know considerably more about the actors whose behaviors we ob-
serve. For example, gender, age, and skin color are salient features that
perceivers will use to rapidly categorize a person.1 These social catego-
ries and the stereotypes associated with such categories may greatly in-
fluence interpretations of an actor’s behavior. For example, the same
ambiguous behavior is perceived as more aggressive when performed
by a Black than a White target (Duncan, 1976; Sagar & Schofield, 1980;
see also Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Darley & Gross, 1983; Krueger &
Rothbart, 1988; Kunda & Sherman–Williams, 1992). As such, it might be
expected that stereotypes would influence the likelihood that trait
inferences would be drawn spontaneously from observed behaviors.
In fact, recent research conducted by Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, and van
Knippenberg (2003; see also Howard & Uleman, 1997) demonstrated just
such effects. Participants were presented with trait-implying sentences
that described behaviors that were either stereotype–consistent or stereo-
type–inconsistent with a category label that was activated subliminally
immediately preceding each sentence. For example, the sentence “X wins
the science quiz” was preceded by the subliminally presented category la-
bel “professor” or “garbage man.” Across five experiments, results
showed that STIs were more likely to occur for consistent than for incon-
sistent behaviors. Moreover, STIs based on stereotype–inconsistent be-
haviors were significantly weaker than STIs made from those same
behaviors when the stereotype was not primed. No differences were
found between STIs made from stereotype–consistent behaviors and the
neutral (no prime) baseline. These results suggest that a “default” STI pro-
cess was obstructed in the case of stereotype–inconsistent category–be-
havior combinations. Stereotype–consistent category labels, however,
did not seem to enhance the “default” STI process.
Wigboldus et al. (2003) propose that the process underlying these find-
ings is based on accessibility effects. It is assumed that, by default, traits
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1. Although some researchers included information about these target attributes in their
stimuli (e.g., Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Carlston et al., 1995), the attributes were not
systematically varied or analyzed.
get spontaneously activated on the basis of trait-implying behaviors. Sim-
ilarly, the activation of a stereotype will make stereotype–consistent traits
temporarily more accessible and simultaneously will make stereo-
type–inconsistent traits temporarily less accessible (e.g., Dijksterhuis &
van Knippenberg, 1996). In the case of stereotype–consistent category–be-
havior combinations, there is no competition between both trait activa-
tions. However, in the case of stereotype–inconsistent category–behavior
combinations, there will be competition between the different activations
or trait accessibilities. In two studies in which the order of presentation of
the category information (stereotype activation) and the behavioral infor-
mation (trait-implying sentences) were varied, Wigboldus et al. (2003,
Exp. 4 & 5) found that STI generation was interfered with only when a ste-
reotype–inconsistent category label preceded the behavioral information.
When an inconsistent category label was presented after the trait-imply-
ing behavior, no such effect was found. These findings strongly support
the idea that stereotype labels activate traits that are inconsistent with the
trait implications of a behavior, and this competing activation interferes
with the generation of STIs at encoding.
The central aim of the current research was to examine the extent to
which these stereotype–based inference processes are moderated by the
availability of processing capacity. Research into the efficiency of STIs has
shown that, in general, the STI process is neither disrupted nor enhanced
by concurrent load (Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1990; Winter et al., 1985;
but also see Skowronski, Carlston, Mae & Crawford, 1998). This suggests
that the STI process is quite efficient (although some interference with the
STI process has been found at very high-load levels; Uleman, Newman, &
Winter, 1992).
However, there are reasons to expect that the effects of stereotypes on
STIs may be influenced by the availability of cognitive resources. Stereo-
types are commonly characterized as efficient social perception tools
that provide a relatively large amount of social information and require
very little effort to activate and apply. Consistent with this characteriza-
tion, stereotypes have been found to be especially likely to guide social
perception when processing capacity is low (e.g., for reviews, see Fiske,
1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Hilton & von Hippel, 1996; Sherman,
Macrae, & Bodenhausen, 2000). With respect to intentional inferences,
Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, and Frost (1998; see also Sherman & Frost,
2000) demonstrated that when resources were low, perceivers were par-
ticularly likely to extract the conceptual gist (trait meanings) from con-
sistent but not inconsistent behaviors in an intentional impression
formation task. In contrast, when cognitive resources were high, both
types of behaviors were understood equally well. We would like to ar-
gue that spontaneous and unintentional inference processes also would
be more likely to be influenced by stereotypes when resources are de-
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pleted. That is, it is especially likely that stereotypes will be activated
when cognitive resources are depleted. Therefore, in these resource–de-
pleted conditions, the competition between traits activated on the basis
of the stereotype and traits activated on the basis of the behavior will be
greatest and the resources available to resolve the competition will be
minimal. Although Wigboldus et al. (2003) found no evidence that spon-
taneous inferences of stereotype–consistent behaviors were facilitated
by stereotype labels, we hypothesized that such effects might be more
likely when cognitive resources are low and comprehension is more
difficult. Two experiments were conducted to test these hypotheses.
EXPERIMENT 1
OVERVIEW
Both experiments relied on a probe recognition task developed by
McKoon and Ratcliff (1986) to examine spontaneous inference processes,
and modified by Newman (1991, 1993) to measure STIs. This is also the
task that was used in the previously described studies by Wigboldus et al.
(2003) that found initial evidence that STIs are moderated by stereotypes.
In this task, participants are presented with trait-implying sentences, such
as “He stepped on his girlfriend’s feet during the foxtrot.” After reading
the sentence, participants are presented with the target trait (“clumsy”)
and are asked to indicate as quickly and as accurately as possible whether
or not this probe word was included in the preceding sentence. To the ex-
tent that the trait is spontaneously inferred upon reading the sentence, it is
more difficult to correctly report that the trait was not actually included in
the sentence. Activation of a trait at encoding is thus assumed to interfere
with the subsequent trait probe task. In line with this assumption,
trait–implying sentences result in longer response times to trait probes
than to control sentences (Uleman, Hon, et al., 1996).
In Experiment 1, behavioral descriptions that implied traits that were
either consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype of Asian Americans
were presented. The name of the actor in each behavior was either a typi-
cally Caucasian or a typically Asian name. Responses to trials with Cau-
casian names provide a baseline for responses to consistent (typically
Asian) and inconsistent (typically non–Asian) behaviors. Half of the
participants were put under a cognitive load as they read the behaviors
and performed the probe word recognition task. On the basis of past re-
sults (Wigboldus et al., 2003), we expected that, even in the low-load
condition, stereotypes might influence the likelihood of inferring traits
from consistent and inconsistent behaviors. If so, then participants
would require more time to correctly reject traits implied by consistent
than by inconsistent behaviors when the behaviors were paired with
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Asian names. No such differences were expected for behaviors paired
with Caucasian names.
On the basis of Wigboldus et al. (2003), specific predictions regarding
the absolute facilitation (in the case of stereotype–consistent behaviors)
and inhibition (in the case of stereotype–inconsistent behaviors) can also
be made. In line with Wigboldus et al., we expected that in the case of ste-
reotype–inconsistent category–behavior combinations, stereotypes ob-
struct the spontaneous inferences that would be made solely from the
behaviors. Thus, participants would require less time to correctly reject
traits implied by Asian–inconsistent behaviors when those behaviors
were paired with Asian names than in the baseline condition.
Thus, in the stereotype–inconsistent behavior condition, the STI pro-
cess will be obstructed due to the competition between traits activated
on the basis of the stereotypical category label and the trait-implying be-
havior. No such competition will take place in the case of stereo-
type–consistent category–behavior combinations. Therefore, no
difference was expected in the time that it took to correctly reject traits
implied by Asian–consistent behaviors when those behaviors were
paired with Asian names compared to the baseline condition, when they
were paired with Caucasian names, particularly in the low-load
condition.
Most importantly, however, in all cases, we expected the influence of
stereotypes on STIs to be greater in the high-load condition than in the
low-load condition. When attentional capacity is depleted, the effects of
stereotypes on the comprehension of stereotype–relevant material
should be maximized, perhaps even leading to facilitatory effects on the
inferences made from stereotype–consistent behaviors paired with
stereotypic names.
METHOD
Participants. One hundred and sixteen Northwestern University stu-
dents enrolled in an Introduction to Psychology class participated for
partial course credit. Participants were run in sessions of 1–5 people.
Materials. Based on pretesting, 12 sentences were selected that implied
traits relevant to the stereotype of Asian Americans. Of these sentences,
six implied traits stereotypic of Asian Americans (two each implied shy,
smart, and hardworking), and six implied traits counterstereotypic of
Asian Americans (two each implied aggressive, conceited, and dumb;
Rothbart & John, 1993). In addition to these 12 sentences, six sentences
that implied but did not include traits irrelevant to the stereotype of
Asian Americans were also presented to prevent participants from
guessing the purpose of the experiment. Eighteen filler sentences were
also developed in which the implied and probed trait word was actually
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present in the stimulus sentence. These sentences were all irrelevant to
the Asian American stereotype.
Based on pilot testing, names that were highly indicative of Caucasian
(e.g., Richie Fairfox) and Asian (e.g., Henry Wong) ethnicities were se-
lected to be paired with the sentences. The Caucasian and Asian names
were each paired with six key sentences (three consistent, three inconsis-
tent). Filler sentences were paired with a mixture of Caucasian, Asian,
Latino, and African American names. The six key behaviors that were
paired with Caucasian and Asian names were reversed in a be-
tween-subjects factor that provided an internal replication.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were taking part in a memory
experiment. Because interest centered on spontaneously occurring trait in-
ferences, nothing was mentioned about inferring personality traits or form-
ing impressions of others. Participants were told that they would be seeing
a series of sentences on their computers, and that after each one they would
be asked to respond to a word that would appear on the screen. They were
instructed that, upon the presentation of this word, they were to press the
button on their keyboard marked “yes” if that exact word had been in the
sentence they had just read, and to press the button marked “no” if the
word had not been in the sentence. They were instructed to respond as
quickly and as accurately as possible. To familiarize participants with the
procedure, prior to responding to the behavioral items, participants were
given practice items having nothing to do with personality traits or stereo-
types. During the experiment, participants paced themselves through the
behavior–trait pairs, which were presented randomly. The reaction time for
each item was recorded and served as the dependent measure.
As they performed this task, half of the participants were placed in a high
cognitive load condition. These participants were further informed that the
experiment was concerned with people’s ability to perform multiple tasks
at the same time. A cognitive load was manipulated by asking these partici-
pants to hold an eight–digit number in memory as they performed the ex-
perimental task. This method has been used frequently and successfully in
past research to deprive participants of processing resources (e.g., Gilbert &
Hixon, 1991; Sherman & Frost, 2000; Sherman et al., 1998).2
RESULTS
Incorrect “yes” responses to the key items were removed from the data
set. There were only four such responses. Reaction times greater than 2
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2. Analyses that both included and excluded four participants who incorrectly reported
four or more of the digits produced the same results. The reported analyses include these
participants.
standard deviations above the mean were replaced with the mean for the
particular item in question. This resulted in the replacement of approxi-
mately 2.5% of the responses. Reaction times for relevant items were aver-
aged to form indices of stereotype–consistent and –inconsistent responses
for each participant. All means are reported in milliseconds.
A 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) × 2 (internal replication) × 2 (target
ethnicity: Caucasian vs. Asian) × 2 (stimulus type: Asian stereo-
type–consistent vs. –inconsistent) ANOVA with repeated measures on
the last two factors was conducted on the reaction times. This analysis
produced a marginally reliable three–way interaction between target
ethnicity, stimulus type, and load, F(1, 112) = 2.77, p < .10. As planned,
separate analyses were conducted on responses in the high- and
low-load conditions. In the low-load condition, a 2 (replication) × 2 (tar-
get ethnicity: Caucasian vs. Asian) × 2 (stimulus type: Asian stereo-
type–consistent vs. –inconsistent) ANOVA, with repeated measures on
the last two factors, produced no reliable results, all Fs < 1 (see Figure 1,
top panel). In the high-load condition, the same analysis produced a reli-
able interaction between target ethnicity and stimulus type, F (1, 58) =
4.21, p < .05 (see Figure 1, bottom panel). Further analyses demonstrated
that when the behaviors were paired with Asian names, more time was
required to correctly reject Asian–consistent (M = 1,051) than –inconsis-
tent (M = 1,003) traits, F(1, 59) = 3.68, p = .06. The time required to cor-
rectly reject Asian–consistent (M = 1,016) and –inconsistent (M = 1,045)
traits did not differ in the baseline condition in which the same behaviors
were paired with Caucasian names, F(1, 59) = 1.61, p = .21.
The comparison between reaction times for Asian–consistent behav-
iors paired with Asian and Caucasian baseline names was not reliable,
F(1, 59) = 1.46, p = .23. Thus, there was no evidence for absolute facilita-
tion effects. However, the comparison between reaction times for
Asian–inconsistent behaviors paired with Asian and Caucasian names
was marginally reliable, F(1, 59) = 3.05, p < .09, and the means indicated
that STIs for stereotype–inconsistent behaviors were obstructed in the
high-load condition.3
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3. In this experiment, comparisons of responses to consistent and inconsistent items may
be of limited value, given that the items include both different behaviors and different
probes. Thus, for example, correct responses to inconsistent items may require more time
than correct responses to consistent items because the inconsistent behavior–trait pairs im-
ply their trait more strongly than do the consistent behavior–trait pairs. Such differences
may be magnified by a cognitive load, which interferes with comprehension. In fact, in the
Caucasian baseline in the high-load condition, responses to inconsistent items did require
somewhat more time than did responses to consistent items. This is important to keep in
mind in interpreting the absolute facilitation and inhibition results.
DISCUSSION
The results from this experiment provide initial evidence that stereo-
types are particularly likely to influence STIs when processing capacity
is depleted. In the high-load condition, participants required more time
to correctly reject Asian–consistent than Asian–inconsistent traits when
stereotypically Asian behaviors were paired with Asian names. No such




























FIGURE 1. Mean reaction times in milliseconds to trait probes as a function of target
ethnicity and stereotype consistency under low cognitive load (top panel) and high
cognitive load (bottom panel) in Study 1.
or when behaviors were paired with Caucasian names (regardless of
processing capacity). Indeed, just the opposite tendency was observed
for Caucasian names in the high-load condition. These data suggest that
when capacity is low, stereotype–inconsistent traits are less likely to be
spontaneously inferred than stereotype–consistent traits. In addition, in
the high-load condition, Asian–inconsistent traits were rejected more
quickly when behaviors were paired with Asian names than when they
were paired with Caucasian names, providing evidence of absolute in-
hibition of inconsistent STIs. However, although Asian–consistent traits
were rejected somewhat more slowly when behaviors in the high-load
condition were paired with Asian rather than Caucasian names, this dif-
ference did not approach significance. These results are consistent with
the findings of Wigboldus et al. (2003), who also found evidence for
absolute inhibition of inconsistent traits but not absolute facilitation of
consistent traits.
The data from Experiment 1 provide initial support for our hypothe-
ses, but they are not conclusive. Although the critical two–way interac-
tion was significant in the low-capacity condition and not in the
high-capacity condition, the overarching three–way interaction was
only marginally significant. Moreover, the use of Caucasian names as
controls might not have been ideal, because these names might them-
selves have invoked a stereotype. Therefore, replication and extension
of the Experiment 1 findings seemed to be in order, and a second
experiment was performed.
EXPERIMENT 2
The aims of Experiment 2 were to replicate the findings from Experi-
ment 1 with a different methodology and a wider variety of stereotypes.
In Experiment 2, we used a modification of the probe recognition task
developed by McKoon and Ratcliff (1986). In order to be able to use mul-
tiple stereotypes, but at the same time keep the total number of trials as
small as possible, we presented multiple probes after each behavioral
sentence. That is, each sentence was followed by five different probes. In
this way, many fewer filler sentences were necessary. We wanted to
keep the total number of trials as low as possible to prevent the task itself
from becoming too demanding (which would more or less eliminate our
capacity manipulation).
Another modification in Experiment 2 was that stereotypes were acti-
vated by means of a category label (e.g., garbage man) presented sublim-
inally prior to each sentence. This subliminal presentation obscured the
purpose of the experiment and minimized social desirability concerns.
In addition, it allowed us to create control trials in which, instead of a ste-
reotypical category label, the word “human” was presented sublimi-
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nally before a sentence (for a similar method, see Wigboldus et al., 2003).
This avoids the potential pitfalls of presenting Caucasian names, which
may have activated Caucasian stereotypes, on the control trials of
Experiment 1.
METHOD
Participants. Sixty–eight University of Nijmegen students participated
in this study. Participants were recruited on campus and received Fl. 5
(approximately $ 2.5) for their participation. All participants were native
Dutch speakers.
Materials. Based on pretesting, four pairs of trait-implying sentences
were selected, each sentence describing one specific behavior of an actor.
Sentences were selected such that for each pair of sentences, one sen-
tence implied a trait stereotypic of a specific social category, whereas the
other sentence implied a trait counterstereotypic of this category. The re-
verse was the case for another social category. For instance, the sentence
“X hits the saleswoman,” implying the trait aggressive, may be consid-
ered stereotype–consistent for a skinhead but stereotype–inconsistent
for a girl, whereas the sentence “X comforts the little boy,” implying the
trait sweet, may be considered stereotype–consistent for a girl but ste-
reotype–inconsistent for a skinhead. The other three pairs of trait-imply-
ing sentences (and associated social categories) described smart versus
stupid behavior (professor vs. garbage man), helpful versus antisocial
behavior (boy scout vs. punk), and industrious versus lazy behavior
(manager vs. Surinamese).
Procedure. Participants were told that they were participating in a dual
tasking experiment; nothing was mentioned about inferring personality
traits or forming impressions of others. It was explained that they would
be presented with a series of sentences on their computers, and that after
each sentence they would be asked to respond to five probe words that
would appear on the screen. They were instructed to respond as quickly
and as accurately as possible upon the presentation of these probe
words. For each probe word, they were asked to press the green button
on their keyboard marked “yes” if that exact word had appeared in the
sentence they had just read and to press the red button marked “no” if
that word had not been in the sentence. A brief five–sentence practice
session using sentences unrelated to the purpose of the experiment was
used to familiarize participants with this task.
Next, the second task of this dual-tasking experiment was described to
participants. Immediately preceding each sentence, a randomly chosen
one–digit (low-load condition) or five–digit number (high-load condi-
tion) was presented for 5 seconds. Participants were instructed to mem-
orize this number. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to
type the number provided at the start of the trial. Feedback about the ac-
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curacy of this response was provided immediately after the response.4
Participants were familiarized with this procedure via another short
practice round presenting the same five sentences used in the first
practice round.
After the practice trials, participants were presented with 24 experi-
mental trials. These trials were presented in random order and con-
sisted of the eight stereotype–relevant sentences described above. Each
was presented three times: once preceded by a masked, subliminally
presented (33 ms) stereotype–consistent category label, once preceded
by a subliminally presented stereotype–inconsistent category label,
and once preceded by a subliminally presented stereotype–neutral la-
bel (human). Responses to the sentence preceded by the neutral label
provide a baseline that can be used to evaluate the effects of the stereo-
type–consistent and stereotype–inconsistent labels on recognition
performance.5
Each sentence stayed on the screen for 1,000 ms and was followed by
five probe words that were presented in random order. The critical
probe word was the trait implied by the behavior in each sentence. The
other four probe words served as fillers to prevent participants from
having to respond “no” to each probe word. One filler probe consisted of
the verb presented in the sentence (“yes” response), one consisted of the
object presented in the sentence (“yes” response), one consisted of a trait
that was not implied by the sentence (“no” response), and, finally, one
consisted of an article that was presented in some cases but not in others
(sometimes “yes,” sometimes “no” response). For instance, the sentence
“X hits the saleswoman” was followed by the probe words “aggressive,”
“hits,” “saleswoman,” “sweet,” and “the.” Reaction times to the probe
words were recorded by the computer.
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4. In the low-load condition (one–number digit), on average, participants reported the
wrong number on 3.1% of the trials, whereas in the high-load condition (five–number
digit) the wrong number was reported on 23.7% of the trials, F(1, 66) = 57.30, p < .001. This
difference confirms our load manipulation. Moreover, the rather high percentage of
wrong numbers justifies the use of a five–digit number instead of an eight–digit number in
the high-load condition (cf. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Analyses both including and excluding
these responses produced the same results. The reported results included response times
from these trials.
5. After the experiment, participants were asked whether they had noticed any flashes
during the presentation of the sentences. Sixteen participants indicated that they had no-
ticed some flashes. Subsequently, these participants were asked whether they had recog-
nized these flashes as words. Two participants indicated that they had recognized words.
When asked what words were presented, however, neither of them mentioned any of the
category labels that were used.
RESULTS
Incorrect “yes” responses to key trait probe items were removed from
the data set. There were only nine such responses. Reaction times greater
than 2 standard deviations above the mean were replaced with the mean
for the particular item in question. This resulted in the replacement of
approximately 4.5% of the responses. Reaction times for relevant items
were averaged to form indices of stereotype–consistent, stereotype–in-
consistent, and stereotype–neutral baseline responses for each partici-
pant. All means are reported in milliseconds.
A 2 (cognitive load: high vs. low) × 3 (stereotype consistency: consis-
tent vs. inconsistent vs. neutral) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated
measures on the last factor was conducted on the reaction times. This
analysis yielded a main effect for stereotype consistency, F(2, 65) = 3.77,
p < .05, which was qualified by the expected interaction between cogni-
tive load and stereotype consistency, F(2, 65) = 5.75, p < .005 (see Figure
2). Analyses of simple main effects demonstrated that, in the low-load
condition, participants required the same amount of time to correctly re-
ject traits implied by stereotype–consistent, stereotype–inconsistent,
and stereotype–neutral sentences, F < 1. However, in the high-load con-
dition, reaction times differed as a function of stereotype consistency, F
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FIGURE 2. Mean reaction times in milliseconds to trait probes as a function of stereo-
type consistency and cognitive load in Study 2.
(2, 65) = 7.90, p < .001. Specific comparisons indicated that participants
required more time to correctly reject traits when the sentences were
preceded by stereotype–consistent (M = 658) and stereotype–neutral
primes (M = 659) than when they were preceded by stereotype–inconsis-
tent primes (M = 623), t (33) = 3.34, p < .005 and t (33) = 2.98, p < .005,
respectively.
DISCUSSION
In line with our expectations and the results of Experiment 1, when ca-
pacity was depleted, participants made weaker trait inferences for ste-
reotype–inconsistent category–behavior combinations than for
stereotype–consistent combinations. Further replicating Experiment 1,
trait inferences from inconsistent category–behavior combinations
were inhibited compared to baseline in the high-load condition. More-
over, as in Experiment 1, no absolute facilitation was found for consis-
tent items relative to baseline in any condition. In addition, no
differences in spontaneous trait inferences were found as a function of
stereotype consistency in the low-load condition. Thus, as in Experi-
ment 1, these results provide evidence for the inhibition of
counterstereotypic STIs under cognitive load, but not for the
facilitation of stereotypic STIs.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In two experiments and across multiple social categories, it was shown
that the influence of stereotypes on STIs is moderated by the availability
of processing capacity. When capacity was depleted, weaker STIs were
found for stereotype–inconsistent than stereotype–consistent behav-
iors. In addition, STIs for inconsistent behaviors were inhibited com-
pared to a neutral baseline in these conditions. None of these effects
emerged when participants enjoyed full processing capacity (Experi-
ment 1) or were under a very low-load (Experiment 2).
Two findings here deserve further comment. First, the results from
both experiments showed evidence for the obstruction of STIs based on
stereotype–inconsistent behaviors, but no faciliatory effects for STIs
based on stereotype–consistent behaviors. Notably, Wigboldus et al.
(2003) similarly found evidence for inhibition but not facilitation. It is
tempting to conclude from these results that stereotypes influence social
comprehension primarily by interfering with the encoding of inconsis-
tent behaviors, and not by facilitating the encoding of consistent behav-
iors. However, we believe that at this moment a conclusion based only
on competition of different trait activations could be premature. The
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particular stimuli chosen for these studies make it very difficult to ob-
serve facilitation effects. This is, because the key behavior/trait pairs
that were selected for use were selected specifically because the behav-
iors strongly imply the traits. As such, there may be ceiling effects in
terms of the spontaneity with which the traits are inferred from the be-
haviors, leaving room only for inhibition. Studies that employ more am-
biguous stimuli may be more likely to demonstrate facilitation effects.
Given the facilitatory effects of stereotypes on all sorts of other depend-
ent measures (as described in the introduction), it seems likely that the
probability of spontaneously inferring traits from behaviors would also
be facilitated for ambiguous behaviors.
The second finding that deserves comment is our failure to find any
evidence of stereotypic influences on STIs in the low-load conditions.
Wigboldus et al. (2003) demonstrated such effects. However, although
those experiments relied on the same trait probe technique as the cur-
rent ones, there are some important differences between the studies.
One important difference is that participants in the Wigboldus et al. ex-
periments were required to perform a much larger number of experi-
mental and filler trials than in both current experiments. As such, it is
possible that fatigue was a factor in the studies, and that participants
were, in fact, capacity depleted. This could mean that the results pre-
sented by Wigboldus et al. (2003) are restricted to low-capacity condi-
tions. However, other differences in the studies having to do with the
particular behaviors, traits, names, and social categories employed
(Experiment 1) and the multiple probe method used in Experiment 2
may also have contributed to the different findings. For instance, in Ex-
periment 1, names were used as a basis for categorization. STI effects
with names maybe harder to get because they require a processing step
that goes beyond that necessary when stereotype labels are directly
presented. That is, the names must first lead to category inferences be-
fore those inferences can affect STIs. This could be one reason why in
Experiment 1 no effect was found in the high-capacity condition. With
respect to Experiment 2, it could be argued that in a recognition probe
paradigm, the strongest effect will be found when each sentence is fol-
lowed by one probe. With multiple probes, the effect of the inferences
made on the basis of the sentence may slowly fade out. Therefore, STI
effects may be harder to obtain in a multiple probe paradigm. This
could explain why in Experiment 2 no effects were found in the
high-capacity condition. In any case, we do not wish to claim that ste-
reotypes will necessarily only influence STIs when capacity is low. To
the contrary, it seems likely that such effects may occur in many
contexts. We claim only that stereotypes are more likely to influence
STIs when capacity is low than when it is high.
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ON THE INEVITABILITY AND APPLICATION OF
SPONTANEOUS TRAIT INFERENCES
One of the central issues in research on STIs concerns their inevitability.
Recent research suggests that they are very difficult to prevent. STIs
have been observed with both comprehension and memory instruction
sets (e.g., Carlston et al., 1995). Likewise, STIs were demonstrated in the
present research, despite the absence of any explicit instruction to form
target impressions. STIs also have been shown to be relatively impervi-
ous to fluctuations in processing capacity (e.g., Lupfer et al., 1990; Win-
ter et al., 1985). However, robust as they may be, the present results
demonstrate that STIs are not inevitable. Wigboldus et al. (2003) demon-
strated that stereotypes may inhibit STIs for counterstereotypic behav-
iors. Our results show that this may be particularly likely under
cognitive load.
Another central issue in the STI literature concerns the nature of the in-
ference that is made. In particular, participants may infer only the trait
meaning of the behavior, may implicitly associate the trait with the ac-
tor, or may infer that the actor actually possesses the trait. Although con-
siderable energy and resources have been devoted to the resolution of
this issue, consensus remains elusive (e.g., Brown & Bassili, 2002;
Carlston et al., 1995; Todorov & Uleman, 2002). Certainly, we are in no
position to settle the issue based on our data. However, we would note
that the effects demonstrated in our studies have important implica-
tions, regardless of the extent to which participants’ inferences are di-
rectly applied to the actors. Stereotypes may be changed by
stereotype–inconsistent behavior only when the behavior is identified
as such. Although identification of inconsistent behavior certainly does
not guarantee stereotype change, the absence of such identification pre-
cludes the possibility. Even if the trait implied by the behavior is not di-
rectly applied to the actor, the enhanced accessibility of identified but
not applied counterstereotypic traits may yet have important influences
on social cognition and behavior. For example, the threshold for perceiv-
ing future counterstereotypic behavior by the individual or other group
members may be lowered. In addition, the accessibility of the
counterstereotypic trait may diminish the likelihood that the perceiver
will act toward the target in ways that produce self–fulfilling hypotheses
(e.g., Chen & Bargh, 1997).
CONCLUSION
These results add to a large body of research on the manner in which ste-
reotypes influence social comprehension processes. Past research has
shown that stereotypes can affect the meanings ascribed to consistent
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and inconsistent behaviors (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Darley &
Gross, 1983; Duncan, 1976; Krueger & Rothbart, 1988; Kunda &
Sherman–Williams, 1992; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Prior research has
also shown that traits are more likely to be inferred spontaneously from
stereotype–consistent than stereotype–inconsistent behaviors (e.g.,
Wigboldus et al., 2003). Finally, when explicitly attempting to form an
impression of another person, perceivers under a cognitive load have
been shown to be more likely to extract the gist meaning of consistent
rather than inconsistent behaviors (Sherman et al., 1998). The present re-
sults extend these findings by demonstrating that stereotypes are espe-
cially likely to affect the extent to which traits are spontaneously inferred
from behaviors when processing capacity is depleted.
Stereotypes have long been heralded as efficient social perception
tools that allow perceivers to infer a great deal about other persons with
relatively little effort (e.g., Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994;
Hilton & von Hippel, 1998; Sherman et al., 2000). The present results
demonstrate just how pervasive is the use of these tools. Even if
perceivers have no intention to extract impressions from others’ behav-
ior, stereotypes may be recruited and applied spontaneously, particu-
larly if cognitive resources are low. As is the case with other stereotypic
influences on social inference processes, spontaneously applied stereo-
types bias comprehension in a self–perpetuating manner. Given that
perceivers may be unlikely to even be aware that they are using stereo-
types in these contexts, efforts to decontaminate social perception from
the influence of stereotypes may be very difficult indeed.
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